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SCHOOL SEARCH WITHOUT 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
IMPROPER 
R. v. A.M., 2004 ONCJ 98 
 
A high school principal had a 
standing invitation with the 
local police to use drug detector 
dogs at the school. The school 
had a zero tolerance policy for drugs and the 
students were aware of both the policy and the 
use of drug dogs. The police attended the school 
and asked for and were granted permission to 
search for drugs. An announcement was made 
over the school P.A. system advising of the 
search and that students were to remain in their 
classrooms. During a search of the gymnasium, a 
drug dog indicated on a back pack. It was 
searched and police found 10 bags of marihuana, 
ten magic mushrooms (psilocybin), and other drug 
paraphernalia. The accused, a youth, was charged 
with possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking and possession of psilocybin. 
 
Although a search without a warrant is prima 
facie unreasonable, “the absence of a Warrant 
for a search conducted by school authorities in a 
school setting does not render the search 
unreasonable.”  However, Justice Hornblower  of 
the Ontario Court of Justice found that a 
search—even in a school setting—must be based 
on reasonable grounds. Without it, the search 
will not be reasonable. In this case, there were 
no reasonable grounds. Although the principal 
may have had a reasonable belief drugs would be 
at the school based on what he was told by 
neighbours and parents of students school, this 
information was all disclosed to him prior to the  
 
 
day the police arrived. In other words, a 
reasonably well educated guess that on any given 
day drugs would be found in the school is not 
enough.  
 
The court also found the search in this case to 
be a police search, rather than a school search—
even though there was a general invitation from 
the school. Justice Hornblower stated: 
 
The fact that school authorities on an earlier 
occasion requested a search by police does not 
convert the search to one by school 
authorities. While the search of the 
gymnasium was done at [the principal’s] 
request, that was the extent of the 
involvement of any school official in that 
search. The search of the school was a 
warrantless search. It was a search for which 
no judicial officer could issue a Warrant, 
there being no reasonable grounds to believe 
drugs would be found. The fact that drugs 
were found after the fact cannot be relied 
upon to support a finding of reasonable 
grounds before the fact. And, although the 
principal's belief that drugs would be found in 
the school might not be seen to be 
unreasonable, it seems equally likely that in any 
gathering of several hundred or more people, 
drugs are likely to be found. Such a likelihood, 
however, does not constitute reasonable 
grounds. [para. 19] 
 
Having found a s.8 Charter violation, the 
evidence was excluded. Although the evidence 
would not effect trial fairness and was on the 
less serious end of the scale, admitting it would 
bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute by suggesting that “persons in the 
same situation as [the accused] have no rights.” 
The charges were dismissed. 
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FINDING FUN IN FITNESS 
Sgt. Kelly Keith 
 
Mental Toughness 
 
During recruit training I do a Lecture on Fear 
and Anger Management. Part of the lecture is 
about Mental Toughness. I was reviewing a 
fitness article on Mental Toughness and the 
more I think about it, the more I see how 
important Mental Toughness is to exercise. 
Mental Toughness is what often separates the 
people who exercise and the people that don’t. 
Some Mental Toughness suggestions:  
 
1) Get an unshakeable belief in achieving your 
goals;  
2) Be prepared for setbacks and have the 
determination to get past them and 
succeed;  
3) Have an unshakable belief that you possess 
the qualities and ability to be better than 
your opponents;  
4) Always stay focused on the task at hand;  
5) Push back the boundaries of emotional and 
physical pain while still maintaining 
technique and effort;  
6) Do not allow yourself to be adversely 
affected by your bad or your opponents 
good performance;  
7) Thrive on the pressure of competition;  
8) Don’t focus on the uncontrollable;  
9) Don’t be afraid to talk to people who have 
been there and done that;  
10) Think about the solutions to your problems 
rather than dwelling on them; and  
11) Get comfortable with the unfamiliar  
 
In the Anger part of the lecture I go into the 
positives of Anger (after I’ve gone over the 
negatives). The two positives that I outline are: 
 
1) Appropriately channelled Anger can enable 
you to keep fighting and/or trying during a 
crisis situation.; and 
2) Appropriate Anger allows us to be 
assertive; to stand up for ourselves and 
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even plays a small role in command 
presence. 
 
Anger can also play a role in fitness if it is 
channelled correctly. Go ahead “Get Angry at 
Yourself!!!!!”  
 
The Movie “CHOKE” is about Rickson Gracie and 
his fights in the Vale Tudo competitions. During 
an interview with Gracie’s wife, she states that 
there are only two ways that Rickson Gracie will 
lose; 1) he gets knocked out or choked 
unconscious or 2) he gets killed. This may seem a 
tad mellow dramatic, however the mental 
toughness this guy has is second to no one. He’s 
got a six-pack and can fight round after round 
without getting tired! 
 
While I’m talking about this side of fitness – if 
your having a weight work-out don’t forget to 
squeeze the muscle your working at the top 
portion of the rep. This enhances the mind 
muscle connection, enhances the pump and 
muscle definition. Flex the muscle between reps 
to get the same results. 
 
Biking into the Wind  
 
The best way to cut through the wind on your 
bike is to align your back with your head and 
keep your side-to-side motion of your head at a 
minimum. Some other quick tip reminders:  
 
1) Don’t sacrifice form for poundage;  
2) Don’t lean on cardio equipment;  
3) Always warm up – get the blood flowing; 
4) If you Run – Don’t skimp on running shoes – 
buy at a running store;  
5) Don’t walk into the gym without a plan;  
6) Whether weight training or cardio – 
remember the importance of proper 
breathing; and  
7) Drink lots of water before, during and 
after.  
 
Position v. Submission 
 
At work I sometimes find myself having to 
convince people that it is always POSITION 
before SUBMISSION. In any altercation 
(police, street fight, competition fight) the one 
factor that is a constant is the winning shot or 
submission most likely came from the person who 
had the POSITION of advantage. The Gracie’s 
sell one of the top martial arts video series in 
the world. Their number one selling video is the 
submission video. The one thing most purchasers 
fail to recognize is that in order to get the 
SUBMISSION they’ve just learned they need to 
be in the POSITION to enable them to get the 
SUBMISSION. One without the other is of no 
use! 
 
While the factors are in your control – don’t 
allow suspects to be in the position of advantage. 
Remember – Action is faster than Re-action – 
this is a basic fact of officer survival - so don’t 
allow the subject to get within your re-actionary 
gap. When you’re approaching or handcuffing a 
suspect – when possible - always approach from a 
position of advantage.  
 
If you believe there is a possibility of a weapon 
and you have the time, always remember cover, 
cover, cover. If time/situation does not allow you 
the availability of cover ensure you use 
angles/concealment to your advantage – make 
the suspect visually and physically change his 
body position to locate you. Those valuable time 
frames used to locate you may be what you need 
to visualize his intent and re-act. This may be 
the difference between who wins and who loses! 
(for some very convincing articles read the Police 
Marksman May/June 2002 study by Joe Weeg 
and/or Police Marksman November/December 
2000 article by Bill Lewinski.)  
 
DETENTION ARBITRARY, 
BREATH SAMPLES EXCLUDED 
R. v. Bell, 2004 ABPC 136 
 
Shortly before midnight, two 
police officers observed a 
known prostitute enter an out 
of province vehicle in an area 
 4            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 5 
  September/October 2004 
frequented by prostitutes. The vehicle was 
stopped and the accused driver subsequently 
provided breath samples and was charged with 
impaired care and control and over 80mg%. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court, the accused 
argued his s.9 Charter right to be free from 
arbitrary detention was violated and that the 
police officer’s observations, the signs of 
impairment, and the results of the breath tests 
should be excluded as evidence under s.24(2). 
The Crown submitted, on the other hand, that 
stopping the accused was a lawful exercise of 
police authority and that the interference was 
not serious enough to warrant exclusion of the 
evidence in any event. 
 
Justice Brown ruled that the detention in this 
case was not a traffic stop. Although the police 
may justifiably conduct random stops of 
motorists to check sobriety, vehicle registration 
and insurance, driver’s licensing, and vehicle 
roadworthiness, that is not what happened in 
this case. The police detention was not 
connected to vehicle-related enquiries—“no 
traffic violations or other suspect driving 
conduct had been observed by the police”. 
Rather, the police wanted to identify the 
accused out of concern for the safety of the 
prostitute.  
 
In holding that the police breached the 
accused’s s.9 Charter right, Justice Brown 
stated: 
 
[The constable] detained [the accused] 
because he was in a vehicle with out-of-
province licence plates, stopped at night in an 
area known for prostitution. [The constable] 
was not investigating any particular crime; nor 
was he looking for any particular suspect. His 
general state of alertness to suspicious 
occurrences, while a commendable quality in an 
on-duty police officer, did not rise even to the 
level of a “hunch” and…a hunch does not 
constitute reasonable grounds for detention. 
 
[The constable] is trained to complete “check-
up slips” to track activity in areas of the city 
known for prostitution and to pass information 
gleaned from this type of checking to the Vice 
Unit. There is no legal obligation on individuals 
questioned by police officers filling out check-
up slips to provide information about 
themselves. [The constable] was not entitled 
to detain [the accused] in order to complete a 
check-up slip… 
 
Had [the constable] chosen merely to pull in 
behind [the accused’s] vehicle and observe, he 
might have developed reasonable grounds to 
detain him but, at the time of the detention, 
[the constable] did not have those grounds. 
[paras. 16-18, references omitted] 
 
The evidence was excluded.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
CHARTER WARNING 
NECESSARY IF ROADSIDE 
SAMPLE NOT FORTHWITH 
R. v. George,  
(2004) Docket:C41000 (OntCA) 
 
After stopping the accused in 
the early morning hours and 
making a roadside screening 
demand, a police officer made a 
request for a device to arrive at his location 
from a different police division because he did 
not have one with him. He was told the device 
would take 15-20 minutes to arrive, which he 
informed the accused. The device arrived in 16 
minutes and a breath sample was taken two 
minutes later. At no time during the wait did the 
officer advise the accused of his right to a 
lawyer. As well, the officer was unaware the 
accused had a cellular telephone—the officer did 
not ask nor did the accused tell him. The accused 
registered a failure. He was arrested, given his 
right to counsel, and subsequently provided 
samples of 146mg% and 137mg%—well in excess 
of the 80mg% legal limit.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused testified on the voire dire that if the 
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officer had provided him with an opportunity to 
call a lawyer he would have done so. The charge 
was dismissed because the trial judge held the 
accused’s Charter right under s.10(b) had been 
violated and the evidence of the breath samples 
was excluded. An appeal to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was dismissed. The Crown 
further appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 
When a roadside demand is made under s.254(2) 
of the Criminal Code the driver is detained and 
their Charter rights under s.10 are prima facie 
triggered. However, if the demand is made 
forthwith, the detainee’s right to counsel can be 
suspended as a reasonable limit justified under 
s.1 of the Charter, thereby allowing the police to 
administer the screening test without advising 
the detainee of their s.10(b) rights.  As the 
Court of Appeal noted, “it is understood that to 
be ‘forthwith’, the demand must be that the 
detainee provide a sample after ‘a brief period 
of detention’, if not ‘immediately’”. 
 
If however, the police are not in a position to 
require a sample before there is any realistic 
opportunity to speak with a lawyer, the demand 
is not valid under the Criminal Code and the 
suspension of s.10(b) rights are not permitted. 
In other words, if the period of time between 
the demand and the time the test could actually 
be carried out would provide a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel, the suspension of 
the right to counsel arising from the detention is 
no longer justified under s.1 and the detainee 
must be advised of their right to speak with a 
lawyer.  
 
In this case, Justice Gillese, authoring the 
unanimous judgment, ruled that the demand did 
not comply with s.254(2) of the Criminal Code. In 
her view, “the demand…was not to provide a 
breath sample “forthwith” but to provide a 
sample when the required apparatus arrived, 
which was some time later”. Justice Gillese 
stated: 
 
[The constable] was not in a position to require 
the [accused] to provide a breath sample 
before there was a realistic opportunity for 
the [accused] to consult counsel.  There was a 
delay of eighteen minutes between the 
issuance of the demand and the taking of the 
sample.  On the record, contact with counsel 
could have been accommodated either through 
the [accused’s] cellular telephone or, given 
that there were no safety concerns associated 
with the [accused], by means of the telephone 
at the nearby police station [located around 
the corner from the stop]… [para. 33] 
 
And further: 
 
In the instant case, the officer was aware 
that there would likely be a delay of fifteen to 
twenty minutes before the screening device 
arrived.  In the face of that information, it 
was incumbent upon the officer to take 
reasonable steps to facilitate the [accused] 
detainee’s right to consult counsel.  Such steps 
would involve asking the detainee whether he 
had a cellular telephone.  In this case, the 
evidence is that the [accused] would have used 
his cellular telephone and called his lawyer.  I 
consider the proximity of the cellular 
telephone more fully below. [para. 42] 
……… 
 
Where an officer is in a position to require 
that a breath sample be provided by the 
detainee before the detainee has any realistic 
opportunity to consult counsel, the detainee 
does not have the right to delay the 
production of the breath sample in order to 
consult counsel by virtue of the ready 
availability of a telephone.  However, where an 
officer is not in a position to require that a 
breath sample be provided immediately after a 
demand for such a sample, the court, in 
determining whether the detainee had a 
realistic opportunity to consult counsel during 
the period of delay, must consider the ready 
availability of a telephone as a relevant factor 
in making that determination. [para. 56] 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the lower 
courts did not err in ruling that the accused’s 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter had 
been breached and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 6            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 5 
  September/October 2004 
PASS-ON INFORMATION OK 
FOR ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
R. v. Wheeler, 2004 NLCA 53 
 
A police officer received 
information at about 2am from 
an unidentified motorist 
(during a very brief exchange) 
that there was a suspected impaired driver in an 
orange or red pick-up in front of a convenience 
store. Twenty seconds later the officer 
attended the convenience store located about 
half a kilometer away and saw the only vehicle, 
matching the description, pulling away from the 
parking lot. The officer turned to follow the 
vehicle, but a second police officer by 
coincidence was traveling in the same direction 
and fell in behind the suspect vehicle. The first 
officer receiving the information about the 
suspected impaired driver radioed ahead to the 
second officer with the information he had 
received. The second officer stopped the 
accused and he was subsequently charged with 
impaired driving and over 80mg%.  
 
At his trial in the Provincial Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador the accused was 
acquitted because he had been arbitrarily 
detained contrary to s.9 of the Charter since 
the officer did not have articulable cause on 
which to justify the stop. In the trial judge’s 
view, the officer made no objective observations 
of the accused or his vehicle and simply stopping 
him on the basis of information provided by 
another officer was insufficient. As a result, the 
breathalyzer readings were excluded. 
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal. 
Chief Justice Wells ruled that there were, in 
the circumstances, “a demonstrable 
rationale…sufficiently reasonable to have 
justified the detention of the [accused]”. 
Furthermore, “information obtained by one 
officer and passed on to another can be relied 
upon to establish articulable cause.” The Chief 
Justice wrote: 
 
The first police officer passed the information 
by radio to the second police officer and it 
was the second police officer that actually 
stopped the [accused]. He did so solely on the 
basis of the information passed to him by the 
first police officer and did not observe any 
erratic driving by the [accused]. 
 
Neither the fact that the original information 
was provided by a person who was not a police 
officer nor the fact that the person's identity 
was not checked by the first police officer, 
would, by itself, diminish, as was argued by the 
[accused], the right (perhaps even 
responsibility) of the police officers to stop 
the [accused’s] motor vehicle. Considering all 
of the circumstances…the explanation of the 
police officers must be accepted as articulable 
cause for detaining the respondent. [para. 6-7, 
references omitted]  
 
The appeal was allowed and the matter was 
referred back to Provincial Court for trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
ID SEARCH DURING 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Greaves, 2004 BCCA 484 
 
A police officer responded to a 
report of an in progress assault, 
occurring at a nearby liquor 
store, perpetrated by a black 
male and several white males who fled the scene 
eastbound. The officer arrived at the liquor 
store in five minutes, did not see anyone, so 
proceeded east. Traveling for only two blocks, 
the officer saw the accused, a black male, and 
two white males walk out from a park in a north-
west direction. Although the black male did not 
closely match the suspect description, the 
officer considered the grouping of a black male 
with two white males unique for that part of the 
city.  
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Brown, beer-bottle-like, long necked bottles 
from which the males were drinking were 
discarded by the men when they saw the officer. 
The officer maneuvered his car to approach the 
men and made eye contact, but they jay walked 
in an apparent effort to avoid him. The officer 
parked his car, walked after the men, and called 
to them to stop. The officer believed, beyond 
mere suspicion, the men were involved in the 
assault. 
 
The officer told the men he was investigating an 
assault and that they matched the general 
description of the suspects. He asked the men 
for identification in an effort to determine who 
they were in the event a photo-lineup was 
warranted. His intention was to allow them to go 
once their identities were established. Both 
white males were identified satisfactorily and 
after a computer check were allowed to proceed. 
However, the accused produced a piece of 
identification without a photo or date of birth in 
the name of Bradley Vrekko from a silver 
cigarette case held open in his hand. The 
accused said he was born in August, then 
changed it to January 1973. Computer queries 
for Vrekko were negative and the officer was 
suspicious that the name was fictitious. The 
accused denied ever having a driver’s licence in 
Canada or ever owning a vehicle. 
 
The officer then took the cigarette case from 
the accused’s hand to further ascertain his 
identity. Other pieces of identification, including 
a service station credit card and motorcycle 
safety certificate, were found in Vrekko’s name, 
however none had a photo or date of birth. A 
computer query revealed a driver’s licence in 
Vrekko’s name—a white male. When asked why he 
had a service station card and a motorcycle 
safety certificate if he never had a driver’s 
licence, the accused turned and took a couple of 
steps as if to run away. The officer grabbed him 
from behind and handcuffed him. The officer 
conducted a cursory search for safety as well as 
for evidence. A pocketknife and two prescription 
pills were found, but a pellet gun in the his 
waistband was missed. 
 
The accused was given the obstruction warning 
for lying about his name. He then provided the 
name of Michael Loyd, but again computer 
checks were negative. A second obstruction 
warning was given and the officer attempted to 
verify his identification by calling a phone 
number provided by the accused. Noting a 
cellular phone in the accused’s shirt pocket, the 
officer took the telephone and called the 
number provided—but it was out of service. The 
officer then scrolled through the numbers on 
the telephone and called a listing tilted “Dad”. 
Calling this listing, the officer learned that the 
telephone had been stolen during a robbery. The 
accused was arrested for possession of the 
stolen phone and he was given his Charter 
warning. He was searched and the pellet gun was 
found. Forty minutes had passed since the initial 
stop. As a result of the stop, the victims in the 
robberies were able to identify the accused in a 
photo lineup and fingerprints found at the scene 
were subsequently matched to him. 
 
The accused was convicted in the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia for various offences relating 
to two separate confinement, threatening, and 
robbery incidents. The trial judge ruled that 
neither the accused’s detention nor the search 
of his property breached the Charter. She found 
the police had an articulable cause the accused 
was involved in the assault and was justified in 
detaining him to further the investigation.  
Furthermore, the inspection of the contents of 
the cigarette case and the address book of the 
cellular telephone were reasonably necessary to 
establish his identity. Moreover, even if there 
were Charter violations, the judge held that the 
admission of the evidence would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing his rights under s.9 (arbitrary 
detention), s.8 (search and seizure), and s.10(b) 
(right to counsel) were violated. 
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Detention 
 
Relying on the recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, Justice 
Lowry, authoring the court’s unanimous 
judgment, concluded that an investigative 
detention will not be arbitrary and offend s.9 of 
the Charter provided two conditions are 
satisfied: 
 
First, the police must have "reasonable 
grounds to detain" in the sense that they 
reasonably suspect that the individual detained 
was involved in a crime under investigation.  
There must be both a subjective and objective 
basis for that belief.  Second, the detention 
must be "reasonably necessary" in all the 
circumstances, including the nature of the 
liberty interfered with and the public purpose 
the interference serves. [para. 33] 
 
In this case the accused argued that the officer 
lacked an articulable cause because there were 
insufficient objectively discernible facts giving 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in the liquor store assault. He submitted 
factors militating against reasonable grounds to 
detain included the fact the men were walking 
towards the liquor store (not away from it), they 
differed in number from the broadcast 
description, and their height, weight, age, and 
clothing description differed. In rejecting this 
argument, Justice Lowry wrote: 
 
In my view, the [accused] has established no 
sound basis for interfering with the trial 
judge's conclusion that [the officer] had 
reasonable grounds to detain for the initial 
investigative detention.  The precise and 
detailed facts which the appellant suggests 
the police must possess in order to form 
reasonable grounds to detain would elevate 
that standard much closer to the higher 
standard of reasonable grounds to arrest.  It 
is clear that the standard of reasonable 
grounds to detain is less demanding than that 
of reasonable grounds to arrest….Articulable 
cause has been said to exist, even where the 
person detained does not match the 
description of a suspect with the type of 
precision the [accused] here suggests is 
required, but the circumstances as a whole still 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion… 
 
The primary purpose of the requirement that 
police have reasonable grounds to detain is to 
ensure that they do not have carte blanche to 
interfere with individual liberty and do not 
detain persons based on mere "hunches".  It 
prevents the discriminatory or capricious 
exercise of police power…It is clear that [the 
officer] was acting on more than an intuitive 
hunch.  His suspicion that the persons detained 
may have been involved in the assault was 
supported by objective facts and was 
reasonable in the circumstances.  Although 
there may not be objective data to support his 
belief that the combination of one black and 
two white males was "unique" in this area, the 
testimony of [two officers] was consistent 
with the fact that this was the only group of 
males –- whether black, white, or some 
combination of the two –- observed in the area 
at the time.  After hearing the testimony of 
[the officers], the trial judge was satisfied 
that his conduct was not racially motivated.  
[paras. 41-42, references omitted] 
 
Although the initial detention was justified, the 
court also examined whether the prolonged 
detention—some forty minutes—ceased to be 
reasonable and became arbitrary. The court 
noted that there was no legal obligation for the 
accused to identify himself. However, rather 
than simply refusing to provide his name, he 
chose to give two false identities. Recognizing 
the distinction between the absence of a legal 
obligation to respond to police questions and the 
existence of a legal obligation to refrain from 
providing false information, the further 
reasonable suspicion that the officer was being 
obstructed provided justification for a more 
protracted and intrusive detention, including 
continued questioning and physical restraint. As 
Justice Lowry noted, “It was reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances, both with 
respect to the assault and a possible 
obstruction charge, to prolong the questioning 
 Volume 4 Issue 5             www.jibc.bc.ca 
September/October 2004 
9
of the [accused] for a further 30 minutes in an 
attempt to discover his true identity”. 
 
Search 
 
In light of the Mann ruling, the power to search 
incidental to investigative detention is 
restricted to searches that are reasonably 
necessary to permit the detention to be safely 
conducted. Thus, searches are limited to officer 
safety, generally through a pat-down frisk and 
do not include searches to determine identity.  
 
The initial pat-down search was largely 
consistent with a safety search, even though 
the officer testified in part he was searching 
for further evidence and removed two pills from 
his pocket. Despite this reservation, the search 
was reasonably necessary since the officer 
reasonably suspected the accused was involved 
in a violent assault.  
 
However, the court concluded that the 
inspection of the cigarette case containing the 
identification and the telephone address book 
were unreasonable and breached s.8 of the 
Charter. Neither searches were reasonably 
necessary to ensure officer safety and 
therefore fell outside the police power to 
search incidental to investigative detention.  
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Although the court was reluctant to pinpoint the 
precise time the detention in this case 
triggered s.10(b) rights and that some delay in 
informing a briefly detained person of their 
s.10(b) rights may be justified, it did rule that 
there was little doubt a detention occurred 
under s.10(b) at the time the officer 
handcuffed the accused, which subjected him to 
significant physical restraint. In failing to 
advise him of his right to counsel at this point, 
the officer violated his s.10(b) Charter rights. 
 
Admissibility of Evidence 
 
Assuming that the identification evidence was 
obtained in a manner that violated the accused’s 
rights, the evidence was nonetheless admissible 
under s.24(2) of the Charter despite the s.8 and 
s.10(b) violations. The evidence did not affect 
the fairness of the trial. The s.8 breaches, 
although serious, were mitigated somewhat by 
the presence of reasonable grounds to arrest 
for obstruction. The s.10(b) violation was minor 
and the officer did not act in bad faith. 
Moreover, the offences charged were serious 
and the evidence obtained essential to a 
conviction. As a result, the admission of the 
evidence would not impair the reputation of the 
administration of justice. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
TWO NEW SUPREME COURT 
JUDGES APPOINTED 
 
The Supreme Court of 
Canada recently saw the 
appointment of two new 
justices. Madam Justice 
Rosalie Abella, from the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, 
and Madam Justice Louise Charron, also from 
the Ontario Court of Appeal, became the newest 
judges added to the nine member court. They 
join Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin (B.C.), Mr. 
Justice John Major (Alta.), Mr. Justice Michel 
Bastarache (N.B.), Mr. Justice William Binnie 
(Que.), Mr. Justice Louis Lebel (Que.), Madam 
Justice Marie Deschamps (Que.), and Mr. 
Justice Morris Fish (Que.).  
 
Did you know that you do not have to be a lower 
court judge to be a member of the Supreme 
Court of Canada? Section 5 of the Supreme 
Court Act allows the appointment of a 
“barrister or advocate of at least ten years 
standing at the bar of a province”. Furthermore, 
at least three judges have to be from Quebec 
and judges may stay with the court until they 
are 75 years old.  
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VEHICLE SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO DETENTION 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Fuller, 2004 BCPC 326 
 
After stopping the accused for 
a vehicle equipment violation, a 
police officer noted a large 
cardboard box on the back 
seat. The officer also observed 
he appeared nervous, shaking as he handed over 
his driver’s licence. When asked about the 
contents of the box, the accused stated it 
contained a television. At this point, the officer 
noted a strong smell of fresh marihuana. A 
probationary constable, accompanying the 
officer, noted the smell was moderate.  
 
The officer ordered the accused from the 
vehicle and told him he was being detained—not 
arrested—for investigation under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act.  The officer also 
stated that the accused would be charged “if” 
any amount supporting a charge was found. The 
vehicle was searched and the taped cardboard 
box opened. In the box, police found 19 ziplock 
bags of marihuana containing ½ kg. each. The 
accused was then handcuffed and read his s.10 
warning and caution from a card. The accused, 
and his wife—the registered owner of the 
vehicle—were charged with unlawful production 
of marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At their trial in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, they argued, among other grounds, that 
their Charter rights under s.8 (search and 
seizure) had been violated. The Crown, on the 
other hand, submitted that initial detention was 
based on articulable cause and the search was 
incident to arrest.  
 
The Search 
 
A search conduced without a warrant is prima 
facie unreasonable unless the Crown can rebut 
the presumption. Warrantless searches 
incidental to arrest under the common law will 
rebut the presumption provided the arrest is 
lawful. However, searches incident to arrest (for 
safety and contraband) are different in scope 
than searches incident to detention (safety 
only).  
 
In concluding that the search of the vehicle  was 
done solely for the purpose of finding 
contraband and could not be justified as incident 
to detention, Justice Chen stated: 
 
Without any basis for a belief that [the 
accused] was armed and dangerous, [the 
police] did not have a right to search [the 
accused]. Once [the accused] was detained and 
handcuffed in the back of the police vehicle, 
there was no threat to officer safety and no 
basis for searching either [the accused] or the 
vehicle. In fact, [the accused] was not 
searched at all until after [the officer] had 
removed the cardboard box from the back of 
[the accused’s] vehicle and opened it to find 
the marihuana In my view, officers with a 
genuine concern for their safety would have 
conducted the search of [the accused] prior to 
any search of the vehicle. [para. 25] 
 
If the officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds, the search could be justified as an 
incident to arrest. However, in this case the 
court found that the officer did not have the 
grounds required to support an arrest. Drawing 
on what the officer said and did, Justice Chen 
ruled that the observations made by the officer 
were sufficient grounds for only suspicion—not 
belief. Using the word “if”—relating to the 
possible discovery of evidence—was somewhat 
ambiguous about whether the officer believed 
there was marihuana in the vehicle. Furthermore, 
the officer “detained” the accused for 
investigation, which was consistent with a 
suspicion there were drugs in the vehicle. As a 
result, the search was unreasonable and the 
evidence excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
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‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter would like to 
share some of our readers’ 
comments about the 
publication.  
************ 
“Your newsletter continues to be an essential 
read for officers who want to keep abreast of 
current legal issues.” Police Constable, British 
Columbia  
************ 
“I find reading the newsletter to provide a 
valuable resource to learning the legal issues in 
policing.”  Police Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“I find what you put together extremely helpful 
and educational.” Police Constable, RCMP Major 
Crime Section British Columbia 
************ 
“Your publication is the most useful one I read 
by far and I am forwarding it to my members.” 
Police Sergeant, RCMP British Columbia 
 
NO NEED TO CHARTER BEFORE 
ROADSIDE SUSPICION 
FORMED 
R. v. Halliwell, 2004 BCPC 359 
 
At about 10:45 pm on New 
Year’s Eve a police officer saw 
three persons exit a vehicle 
that arrived at a parking lot and 
enter a bar. Half an hour later, 
the officer saw the vehicle back up and then 
drive forward, stopping very close to the bar 
doors. The officer decided to check on the 
driver and found the accused in the driver’s 
seat. The officer asked where the occupants had 
come from and how much they had to drink. The 
accused was also asked for her driver’s licence 
and registration. During this time, the officer 
noted a smell of alcohol from inside the vehicle, 
a faint smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath, 
and her watery eyes. The accused also said she 
had a drink back at her residence more than an 
hour before.  
 
Based on these observations, and his belief the 
vehicle occupants had likely been inside the bar 
for 30 minutes, the officer formed a reasonable 
suspicion the accused had alcohol in her body. 
The officer read the roadside screening device 
demand and the accused was charged with failing 
to provide a sample. At her trial in British 
Columbia Provincial Court, the accused argued 
that the officer’s suspicion was not reasonable 
because he relied, in part, on her statement that 
she had been drinking without advising her of 
her Charter rights under s.10(b).  
 
Justice Gordon rejected this argument. In his 
view, “when the police stop a motorist for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with the Motor 
Vehicle Act, or the driving sections of the 
Criminal Code, they have the right, as part of a 
‘preliminary investigation,’ to ask questions of 
the driver that are relevant to that investigation 
and without advising the citizen of his or her 
Section 10 rights.” However, the statements of 
the driver are only limited for the purpose of 
determining whether the officer had the 
requisite belief—in this case a reasonable 
suspicion—on which to base the roadside 
screening device demand. 
 
Even without the drivers statement, Justice 
Gordon would have nonetheless concluded the 
officer had a reasonable suspicion the accused 
had alcohol in her body. She was operating a 
vehicle in close proximity to a drinking 
establishment at 11:15pm on New Year’s Eve and 
had a faint smell of alcohol on her breath. 
Although not enough to satisfy reasonable 
grounds for a breathalyser demand, the factors 
were sufficient to constitute a reasonable 
suspicion for a roadside screening device 
demand.   
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
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CHARTER WARNING 
SUSPENDED DURING IMPAIRED 
INVESTIGATION 
R. v. Pineau, 2004 BCPC 183 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused driving and noted 
symptoms of impairment. In 
response to being asked if he 
had anything to drink, the 
accused said he had “five”. This admission, 
together with other factors, contributed to the 
officer’s opinion that there were reasonable 
grounds to demand a breath sample.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
accused submitted that once the officer decided 
to investigate for impaired driving, his rights 
under s.10 of the Charter arose. Absent this 
proper warning, he argued the certificate of 
analysis should be inadmissible. The Crown, on 
the other hand, contended that once the 
accused admitted to drinking, the officer’s 
reasonable grounds crystallized and it was at 
that point the obligation to provide Charter 
rights arose.  
 
Justice Skilnick agreed with the Crown. In his 
view, even though the accused was detained 
when stopped by police, the officer asked the 
question during the ‘investigatory stage’ and was 
entitled to briefly suspend—as a reasonable limit 
under s.1 of the Charter—the accused’s s.10(b) 
rights until the reasonable grounds to make the 
demand under the Criminal Code were formed.  
This brief suspension of s.10(b) rights also 
includes preliminary investigation using an 
approved screening device or a field sobriety 
test. However, the evidence “can only be used in 
assessing whether or not the police officer had 
the requisite grounds for making a breath 
demand. It cannot be used for determining the 
guilt or innocence on the impaired driving 
charge.”  The certificate of analysis was 
admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
FRASER VALLEY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE 
March 12-15, 2005 
 
“Mass Murder in the Home, 
the School and the Workplace: 
Spree Killers and Annihilators” 
 
Location: 
 
Ramada Inn & Conference Centre 
Abbotsford, BC 
 
Registration: 
 
$299 early bird  
(before December 1, 2004) 
 
$329 regular 
(after December 1, 2004) 
 
Registration fee includes tickets to the 
opening ceremonies and receptions, 
on-site continental breakfasts, and 
tickets for the conference banquet. 
 
Topics: 
 
 Dunblane School Massacre, 
Scotland, 1996 
 Gakhal Family Murders, Vernon, 
British Columbia, 1996 
 Ottawa Transpo Massacre, 
Ottawa, Ontario, 2001 
 Kamloops Murders, British 
Columbia, 2002 
 Port Arthur Massacre, Tasmania, 1996 
 Columbine High School Massacre, 1999 
 
Expert presenters include Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, 
U.S. Army (Retired), Director, Killology Research 
Group, who is one of the world's foremost experts in 
the field of human aggression, the roots of violence 
and violent crime. 
 
Visit www.fvlec.org for more info! 
 
